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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several years, there has been much publicity 
surrounding the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, its wildly fluctuating value, and 
whether or not it is actually secure.1 Further, there is vast deliberation in 
many public forums as to whether Bitcoin will be adopted widely enough 
to become mainstream globally so that its use will spread outside of its 
current predominant specialized use as an alternative asset investment for 
currency speculators and become accepted in small local cafes and large 
multinational banks alike.2 Additionally, there are vast legal questions 
surrounding Bitcoin.3 Although the debate concerning the use and 
adoption of Bitcoin beyond an alternative asset will likely continue for 
several years, the technology underlying Bitcoin is widely regarded as the 
next ‘big thing’ that will transform the operations of many businesses, 
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1 See Ryan Derousseau, Bitcoin for Beginners: 3 Things to Know Before You Invest, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/24/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-investing/; 
David Meyer, Bitcoin and Ethereum Prices Take a Hit After Another Cryptocurrency Was Hacked, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/21/bitcoin-price-ethereum-
price-tether-hacked/; Lucinda Shen, Bitcoin Just Surged Past $8,000. Here's What's Causing 
the Spike, FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/17/ bitcoin-price-
hard-fork-segwit2x/.  
2 See Riley McDermid, The Real Estate Industry is Beginning to Use Bitcoin to Pay for Deals, S.F. 
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/ 
2017/11/22/real-estate-bitcoin-payment.html; Danielle Sabrina, You Are Now Able to Use 
Cryptocurrencies in Person, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/you-are-now-able-to-use-cryptocurrencies-in-
person_us_5a0ee51be4b0e30a95850609. 
3 See V. Gerard Comizio, Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in 
the Emerging Fintech Ecosystem, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 131, 132 (2017); Joshua J. Doguet, 
The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 
73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1121, 1131–36 (Summer 2013). 
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both small and large.4 This technology—called blockchain—has many 
applications that will likely impact the vast majority of industries from 
small agriculture businesses to the larger financial institutions in the 
world.5 However, like Bitcoin, because of the relative newness of 
blockchain, many legal questions have not yet been answered by courts 
and are currently being debated by legal experts, scholars, and 
practitioners.6  
This paper analyzes one potential antitrust issue, specifically the 
antitrust risks relating to horizontal agreements to not deal with particular 
firms when implementing blockchain as a means to assist with transactions 
among financial institutions and other parties.7 This particular use of 
blockchain is highly relevant as many major financial institutions are 
already testing and implementing the utilization of blockchain in this area.8 
                                                 
4 See Clifton Leaf, Believe the Hype: Here's the Actual Next Big Thing in Tech, FORTUNE (Aug. 
22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/blockchain-next-big-thing-tech/; The next 
big thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ special-
report/21650295-or-it-next-big-thing; Rachel Wolfson, Blockchain Technology’s Next Big 
Superstar, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/blockchain-technologys-next-big-superstar_ us_ 59b2bb45e4b0c50640cd66c2. 
5 See Clifton Leaf, Believe the Hype: Here's the Actual Next Big Thing in Tech, FORTUNE (Aug. 
22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/blockchain-next-big-thing-tech/; The next 
big thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ special-
report/21650295-or-it-next-big-thing; Rachel Wolfson, Blockchain Technology’s Next Big 
Superstar, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/entry/blockchain-technologys-next-big-superstar_us_ 
59b2bb45e4b0c50640cd66c2. 
6 See generally Comizio, supra note 3, at 141–59 (describing legal and regulatory initiatives 
in the United States); Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The Disruptive 
Role of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 25 
CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 353, 376–85 (2017) (describing United States and international 
regulation efforts).  
7 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 490 (Jonathan I. 
Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012). 
8 See Bernard Marr, Practical Examples Of How Blockchains Are Used In Banking And The 
Financial Services Sector, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
2018]               BLOCKCHAIN AND ANTITRUST: NEW TECH MEETS OLD REGS               711 
 
Further, the larger financial institutions have already joined together to 
implement this technology; thus, antitrust issues are already a concern.9 
Specifically, Part II of this paper provides a background and 
general overview of blockchain and its technology, including an 
explanation of the components of blockchain, how this technology works, 
a discussion of how blockchain is currently used, how the use of this 
technology might shift over the coming years, and the industries that are 
most likely to utilize this technology.10  
Part III will focus on one particular use of blockchain—payment 
and transfers of large sums of money between financial institutions, their 
clients, and other large organizations.11 This part further discusses ways in 
which the financial industry has already begun experimenting with and 
implementing blockchain technology within this specific application, the 
benefits that blockchain affords this industry, and the likely wide-spread 
adoption of this technology in this industry through the collaboration of 
many global financial institutions.12  
Next, Part IV raises specific antitrust issues and risks that are likely 
to arise from the collaboration of financial institutions using blockchain 
as a means to track, record, and audit payments between financial 
                                                 
bernardmarr/2017/08/10/practical-examples-of-how-blockchains-are-used-in-
banking-and-the-financial-services-sector/#402e5f311a11. 
9 See Jemima Kelly, Exclusive: Blockchain Platform Developed by Banks to be Open-source, 
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2016, 6:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-
blockchain-r3-exclusive/exclusive-blockchain-platform-developed-by-banks-to-be-
open-source-idUSKCN12K17E. 
10 See infra Part II; see also Joshua Ashley Klayman & Dario de Martino, The (Heart)beat Has 
Sounded: The World Economic Forum Places Blockchain Front and Center, 22 WESTLAW J. SEC. 
LIT. & REG. 12, 2 (2016); Stuart D. Levi, Blockchains offer revolutionary potential in fintech and 
beyond, PRACTITIONER INSIGHTS COMMENTS 2017 WL 954702 (Mar. 13, 2017); Reggie 
O'Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 
180–81 (2017).  
11 See infra Part III; see also Marr, supra note 8.  
12 See infra Part III; see also Marr, supra note 8.   
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institutions, their clients, and other large organizations.13 Further, this part 
will provide an overview of the general analytical framework of antitrust 
law and discuss leading applicable cases from the United States Supreme 
Court.14  
Part V concludes with a recommendation to minimize potential 
antitrust risks that financial institutions and/or large organizations might 
face that are currently using blockchain in this way or are considering this 
use.15 This part outlines the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of a 
joint venture’s exclusion and/or expulsion of rivals by assessing four 
specific criteria, including specific examples of joint venture actions 
and/or characteristics that will decrease or increase a joint venture’s 
exposure to antitrust risk.16  
II. BACKGROUND OF BLOCKCHAIN 
A. The Components of Blockchain and How It Works 
 Blockchain is a technology containing a highly encrypted database 
that maintains numerous entries of information, similar to a digital ledger 
that tracks and records all of the transactions that have occurred, and are 
occurring, within that specific blockchain network.17 Blockchain confirms 
the accuracy and authenticity of each transaction and encrypts each 
entry.18 Thus, blockchain is essentially a continuous series of chronological 
blocks of information containing multiple specific individual transactions 
                                                 
13 See infra Part IV; see also EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 153 (2nd ed. 2011); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, 
at 490.  
14 See infra Part IV; see also ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13; ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law, supra note 7, at 490. 
15 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 397, 405 (1912).  
16 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91. 
17 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3; Levi, supra note 10; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–
81. 
18 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2; Levis, supra note 10; O’Shields, supra note 10, at 180. 
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that are verified for accuracy by the majority of users of the technology 
network.19 Further, blockchain maintains a high level of security so that 
past information blocks are not altered or changed once verified.20 “Think 
of a global spreadsheet that is saved and runs on billions of computers 
around the world, where the data is universally verifiable and trackable.”21 
And every new entry onto the spreadsheet “depends on a logical 
relationship to all” the previous entries on the spreadsheet.22  
 Many blockchains accept new entries from numerous parties; 
however, one party inserting a new entry into the blockchain does not 
change the blockchain until the majority of the parties accept this new 
entry.23 Parties to the blockchain accept a new entry by running the new 
entry or transaction through a series of mathematical equations, which are 
called hashes.24 Thus, when a new entry is created, the transactions 
comprising that block are hashed, which produces a unique result for that 
block.25 Then, other nodes that are in that blockchain network use the 
same entries to create the same mathematical equations and confirm that 
the result for that block that was computed by the first party is correct.26 
If the other nodes’ calculation produces a different result than the result 
of the first party, the entry is not confirmed because it contains either an 
                                                 
19 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2.  
20 See O’Shields, supra note 10, at 187.  
21 Klayman, supra note 10, at 2. 
22 Andrew Meola, The Growing List of Applications and Use Cases of Blockchain Technology in 
Business & Life, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider. 
com/blockchain-technology-applications-use-cases-2017-9. 
23 See Portia Crowe, There is a ‘Game Changer’ Technology on Wall Street and People Keep 
Confusing it with Bitcoin, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/what-is-blockchain-2016-3?op=1. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
714          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
 
error or fraud.27 This need for a majority of acceptance increases the 
security of blockchain and eliminates any need for a central organization—
like a government, an accounting firm, or a bank—to approve of each new 
entry and any subsequent transactions.28   
Further, the security of blockchain systems is greatly increased 
because a hacker attempting to change past transactions in the chain or 
conduct other fraudulent activities would require controlling a majority of 
the devices or data points on the larger blockchain network.29 Infiltrating 
and taking control of the majority of the network is an incredibly hard task 
and is also cost-prohibitive.30  
The blockchain technology allows both individuals and 
organizations to make transactions among one another.31 More 
importantly, blockchain provides verification of each transaction, 
including highly specific details of that transaction, and verification occurs 
almost immediately.32 Further, users in the same blockchain network can 
engage in transactions directly with other users in the network, and 
because each transaction is screened for accuracy and corroborated by the 
blockchain network, there is no longer a need for a central authority to 
approve the transaction and its accuracy.33 
  
                                                 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Levi, supra note 10. 
30 See id. 
31 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
32 See id. at 2; Levi, supra note 10. 
33 See Levi, supra note 10. 
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B. Types of Blockchain 
Blockchains are typically either public/permissionless or 
private/permissioned.34 Public blockchains allow for any user to 
participate in the blockchain.35 Thus, anyone can download and utilize the 
blockchain software, participate in the verification process and so forth.36 
Conversely, to gain access to a private blockchain, a party needs 
permission.37 This permission is granted either through a pre-selection of 
the parties that may access the blockchain, approval by an administrative 
party, or satisfaction of certain requirements— for example compliance 
with anti-money laundering regulations.38  
C. The Current and Future Use of Blockchain 
1. Blockchain’s Use in Industries Outside of Finance 
The use of blockchain far exceeds its most known use— the 
technology underlying Bitcoin.39 Blockchain, some argue, has the potential 
                                                 
34 See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, UNLOCKING THE BLOCKCHAIN: A GLOBAL LEGAL 
AND REGULATORY GUIDE 20 (2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ 
files/unlocking-the-blockchain-chapter-1-141574.pdf. 
35 See Ramesh Gopinath, Checking the Ledger: Permissioned vs. Permissionless Blockchains, IBM 
THINK BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/think/2016/07/checking-
the-ledger-permissioned-vs-permissionless-blockchains/; Levi, supra note 10; Unlocking 
the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 20. 
36 See Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 20. 
37 See id.; Gopinath, supra note 35; Levi, supra note 10. 
38 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and 
Private Blockchain, IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-difference-between-public-
and-private-blockchain/; Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra 
note 34, at 20.  
39 Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 15. 
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to impact nearly every industry.40 For example, blockchain has already 
impacted large-scale data management by providing records management 
for businesses and governments that is more secure, yet simpler to use, 
than many other data management technologies.41 Using blockchain 
technologies for data management provides permanent, accurate data 
which allows organizations to decrease the managerial cost of performing 
and complying with audits and government records, among other 
benefits.42   
Further, blockchain allows for enhanced identity management 
“[b]y combining the decentralized blockchain principle with identity 
verification, a digital ID can be created that would act as a digital 
watermark which can be assigned to every online transaction of any 
asset.”43 Thus, the parties to a transaction are identifiable, which should 
decrease fraud and increase the ease of organizational compliance with 
governmental regulations that relate to properly identifying the other party 
to the transaction.44 
2. Blockchain’s Use in Finance 
Blockchain has received much attention concerning its potential 
impact on the financial industry.45 Further, key organizations within the 
                                                 
40 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3–4; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–81; 21 Areas of 
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, MEDIUM (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@LetsTalkPayments/21-areas-of-blockchain-application-
beyond-financial-services-9a007f3db2f1.  
41 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 4; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 189–90; 21 Areas of 
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.  
42 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, 
supra note 40. 
43 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40. 
44 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 180–81; 21 Areas of 
Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.  
45 See Blockchain in Financial Services, PWC FIN. SERVS. INST. (last visited Mar. 10, 2018), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/research-institute/blockchain.html; 
Marr, supra note 8; Alex Tapscott & Don Tapscott, How Blockchain Is Changing Finance, 
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industry see this technology as revolutionizing the industry, as evidenced 
by R3, a consortium of over seventy of the larger financial institutions in 
the world including banks, insurance companies, regulators, and fund 
managers.46 R3 was created for the purpose of researching and developing 
blockchain technology and then implementing that technology 
throughout the financial industry globally.47 Blockchain has and will 
continue to change, and potentially revolutionize, many applications 
within the finance industry, including transactions among financial 
institutions and other parties, the issuance of securities, the trading and 
settlement of stocks, and fraud prevention.48 For example, in December 
2016, Overstock.com, the online retailer, issued nearly two million dollars 
of stock that trades only on a blockchain platform.49 Relatedly, experts in 
the stock market industry expect blockchain to enhance the stock market 
by reducing the amount of time between the clearing and the settlement 
of trades.50 Although blockchain will likely impact many areas within the 
financial industry, the bulk of this paper is limited to an analysis and 
discussion of transactions between financial institutions and other parties, 
as this particular application is one of the likelier applications to have a 
large-scale impact.51 
 
                                                 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-blockchain-is-
changing-finance;. 
46 See Kelly, supra note 9. 
47 See ABOUT, R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).  
48 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–4; Marr, supra note 8; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 
45; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40. 
49 See Daniel DeConinck, Overstock Completes First Public Stock Issuance Using Blockchain, 36 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 416, 424 (2017). 
50 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3. 
51 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 3; Marr, supra note 8; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 
45; 21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF BLOCKCHAIN ON TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER PARTIES 
The Impact of Blockchain on Transactions between Financial 
Institutions and Other PartiesEvery day, trillions of dollars are transferred 
among financial institutions and other parties for various financial 
services.52 The number of parties involved in these transactions reaches 
the billions.53 Importantly, in 2014, it is estimated that financial institutions 
collected well over one trillion dollars in fees for processing payments and 
other related transfers among customers of the banks, including small and 
large organizations and individuals.54 These fees are likely needed to cover 
many necessary administrative activities performed by individuals within 
the current financial system for processing payments and transferring 
funds.55  
The development and implementation of blockchain throughout 
the financial industry will likely have numerous benefits for all participants 
in the industry, including financial institutions, businesses, and individuals, 
as blockchain would likely eliminate many, if not all, of the currently 
necessary intermediaries and administrative activities when banks process 
payments and transfer funds.56 Currently, financial institutions are rife 
with numerous costly activities that also often add long delays that disrupt 
the transfer of funds.57  Further, these activities are not completely secure 
which allows for fraudulent activities to take place and also increases the 
                                                 
52 See Marr, supra note 8. 
53 See id.  
54 See High Tech Meets Low Finance, THE ECONOMIST: BUTTONWOOD BLOG, (Mar. 10, 
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21694531-all-money 
-spent-technology-banking-not-efficient-high-tech-meets-low. 
55 See Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 45. 
56 See Marr, supra note 8. 
57 See id. 
2018]               BLOCKCHAIN AND ANTITRUST: NEW TECH MEETS OLD REGS               719 
 
cost of related activities, such as fraud prevention.58 Thus, financial 
institutions implementing blockchain as a digital ledger that would keep 
track of, protect, and self-audit the transfer of funds for activities like 
payment processing would significantly decrease costs and increase 
security and efficiency.59 Although blockchain is not completely secure 
from fraudulent activities, it stands as a marked improvement to the 
current security used by many financial institutions.60  
To best implement and use blockchain within this application, 
financial institutions and organizations will have to join together to 
implement this technology through a joint venture, or a similar construct, 
as instant electronic communication of information among the parties 
through the blockchain is likely necessary for the parties to fully reap the 
benefits of blockchain.61 Thus, organizations will likely create or join 
groups like the R3 consortium,62 or take part in highly a concerted activity 
like that of the largest banks in Europe, which recently implemented in 
unison the same system of blockchain technology to better facilitate 
international trade.63  
Agreements among competitors, like HSBC and Rabobank, two 
of Europe’s largest banks, raise some interesting potential antitrust issues 
and risks.64 For example, an issue arises when two or more competitors 
                                                 
58 See id. 
59 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
60 See id.; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 179–80, 184; Tapscott & Tapscott, supra note 45; 21 
Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40. 
61 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 183; Tapscott & Tapscott, 
supra note 45. 
62 ABOUT, R3, supra note 47.  
63 Arjun Kharpal, Blockchain technology is moving into the financial mainstream with IBM and seven 
European banks, CNBC (June 26, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/ 
06/26/ibm-building-blockchain-for-seven-major-banks-trade-finance.html. 
64 See id.; see also ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 73–75, 153–54; ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91. 
720          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
 
agree to not deal with or allow the participation of other competitors in 
the formation of joint venture with the purpose of implementing 
blockchain technology.65  
IV. ANTITRUST RISKS AND ISSUES: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 
NOT TO DEAL WITH PARTICULAR FIRMS 
A joint venture comprised of unrelated competitors that excludes 
other competitors and/or refuses to provide access to the joint venture’s 
facilities to other competitors is challengeable under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, as an illegal restraint of trade, or under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act as a conspiracy or attempt to monopolize.66 Generally, when 
competitors enter into a horizontal agreement to boycott or not deal with 
another competitor, this boycott is per se illegal under the Sherman Act.67 
However, when competitors join together in a joint venture or productive 
collaboration, the per se rule for boycotts typically does not apply; instead, 
courts apply a more nuanced analysis.68 Specifically, when competitors 
joined in a productive collaboration decide to boycott a competitor by 
refusing to allow that competitor access to the productive collaboration, 
courts often apply the rule of reason;69 thus, this conduct is only 
considered illegal when the effect of the boycott is an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.70 Courts applying the rule of reason standard consider if 
the agreement among competitors has any “plausible procompetitive 
justification.”71 If such a justification is plausible, the plaintiff is required 
to prove that the agreement’s result in an anticompetitive effect, which the 
plaintiff can prove by offering direct evidence or inferring the 
                                                 
65 See supra note 64.  
66 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490. 
67 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 153.  
68 See id. at 153–54. 
69 See id. at 74–75. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 75. 
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anticompetitive effect by providing the defendant’s high market share.72 If 
the plaintiff proves this effect, the defendant then is required to provide a 
procompetitive benefit of the agreement.73 And if the defendant provides 
“persuasive justification for [the agreement],”74 the plaintiff then can show 
that a “reasonable less restrictive alternative exists.”75 If the plaintiff shows 
this, the plaintiff wins.76  However, if the plaintiff does not, the court then 
weighs the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.77 Similarly, courts 
often apply the rule of reason to situations in which a competitor was 
expelled from a productive collaboration.78   
A. Relevant Leading Cases 
Several leading United States Supreme Court cases address the 
issue of agreements among competitors not to deal with other 
competitors. In United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 
fourteen railroad companies in St. Louis created a joint venture for the 
purpose of purchasing and operating railroad terminals.79 The joint 
venture allowed other companies outside of the joint venture to utilize the 
joint venture’s terminals if the other companies paid a similar amount of 
money for their use that the members of the joint venture paid.80 The 
topographical layout of St. Louis was such that anyone attempting to 
transport via railroad in or through St. Louis required the use of the 
                                                 
72 See id.  
73 See id.  
74 Id. at 223 (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
75 Id.  
76 See id. at 75. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 153–54. 
79 See United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 391, 398 (1912). 
80 See id. at 399–400. 
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terminals owned by the joint venture.81 Although other companies could 
technically utilize the joint venture’s terminals, the joint venture, due to 
the unique layout of the city, held the power to discriminate because 
without the use of its terminals, other companies could not operate in St. 
Louis.82 Further, there were charges that the joint venture discriminated 
against other companies.83 As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
joint venture’s practice of often not allowing other railroad companies 
outside of the joint venture to use the terminals violated the Sherman 
Act.84 The Court emphasized that its holding was heavily impacted by the 
topographical constraints of St. Louis and noted that typically competitors 
may lawfully combine to purchase and operate terminals, even when 
excluding other competitors.85 Interestingly, the Court noted that the joint 
venture “would not be an illegal restraint . . . if it were what is claimed for 
it, a proper terminal association acting as the impartial agent of every line 
which is under compulsion to use its instrumentalities.”86   
Many years later, in Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme 
Court again addressed this issue.87 In that case, approximately twelve 
hundred newspapers in over twenty-five cities established a joint venture 
to disseminate the news it gathered among the members of the joint 
venture.88 This joint venture maintained a very large market share as 
Associated Press members comprised over eighty percent of the 
newspaper circulation in the United States.89 The joint venture did not 
                                                 
81 See id. at 397. 
82 See id. at 397, 399–400. 
83 See id. at 394–96. 
84 See id. at 409. 
85 See id. at 405. 
86 Id. at 410. 
87 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4–8 (1945).  
88 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166. 
89 See id. 
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allow for members to provide news to non-members and also provided 
members of competing applicants the ability to veto a non-member’s 
application of membership.90 The Court held that these bylaws were illegal 
as they restrained trade and critically “limit[ed] the opportunity of any new 
paper to enter these cities.”91 Further, the Court, using very broad 
language with potentially large antitrust implications, stated that any joint 
venture which reduces the opportunity of other competitors to engage in 
buying or selling of “the things in which the groups compete” is an 
unlawful combination.92  
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of expulsion from a joint 
venture in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing 
Co.93 In that case, a joint venture was formed as a buying cooperative for 
several retail stores; however, one of the members of the joint venture was 
expelled for failing to abide by the joint venture’s bylaws.94 The Court first 
addressed the proper standard to address this expulsion.95 The Court 
concluded that the expulsion did not provide evidence that the joint 
venture maintained an anticompetitive motivation nor was it evidence of 
a high probability of an anticompetitive effect resulting from the 
expulsion.96 Further, the Court found that “[u]nless the cooperative 
possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential to 
effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always 
likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted.”97 Thus, if the 
joint venture does not possess market power or exclusive access to a 
                                                 
90 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 9–10. 
91 Id. at 13. 
92 Id. at 15. 
93 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 284, 
286–87 (1985).  
94 See id. at 286—87. 
95 See id. at 289–90. 
96 See id. at 296–98. 
97 Id. at 296. 
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competitively necessary element of the business, courts must apply the 
rule of reason analysis.98 “The decision to apply the per se rule turns on 
‘whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output . . . or 
instead one designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and render markets 
more, rather than less, competitive.’”99 Further, the Supreme Court stated 
that group boycotts frequently garner per se invalidation from courts;100 yet, 
the Supreme Court plainly stated that there is much uncertainty and 
confusion among all the courts concerning the precise types of joint 
venture activity that garner per se invalidation.101 Additionally, the Court 
stated that in many cases that the Court has ruled were per se invalid, the 
boycott typically denied access to an element that was necessary for the 
company to compete and the joint venture held a “dominant position” in 
the market.102  Moreover, “the possibility of countervailing procompetitive 
effects [was] remote.”103 Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower 
court’s decision to eschew per se analysis was correct.104   
 Since Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., cases involving a joint 
venture denying a non-member competitor membership to the joint 
venture or access to the joint venture’s facilities have largely eschewed a 
per se analysis in favor of a rule of reason analysis.105 Further, there appears 
to be some conflict and confusion among the lower courts concerning the 
holding from Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.106 Specifically, whether a 
                                                 
98 See id. at 296–97. 
99 Id. at 289–90 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 
19–20 (1979)). 
100 See id. at 293. 
101 See id. at 294. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 298. 
105 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 492. 
106 See id. at 492–93. 
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finding of market power or exclusive access to a component that is 
necessary for the competitor to compete may be adequate in and of itself 
for a court to rule that the denial of membership or expulsion from the 
joint venture is per se illegal,107 or whether this finding is just “a necessary 
precondition” for a court to find that such actions are per se illegal.108 
Additionally, when courts have analyzed the competitive justifications 
provided by the joint venture for denying a non-member competitor 
membership to the joint venture or to the joint venture’s facilities, many 
courts have recognized as valid the justification that the non-member is 
seeking to benefit from the joint ventures without participating in the 
initial or on-going risks and expenses associated with the joint venture.109   
Thus, in summary, the Supreme Court analyzes a joint venture’s 
exclusion and/or expulsion of rivals by assessing several criteria including:  
(1) the degree to which access is essential to 
effective competition; (2) the nature and 
scope of the joint venture’s power in the 
relevant market; (3) the degree to which the 
benefits of the venture can be duplicated by 
nonparticipants in some other fashion, such 
as the formation of a similar joint enterprise; 
and (4) the business reasons for the refusal 
to grant access.110  
  
                                                 
107 See id.  
108 Id. at 492. 
109 See id. at 493. 
110 Id. at 490–91. 
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V. ADVICE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CONSIDERING A 
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT/JOINT VENTURE WITH THE 
PURPOSE OF USING BLOCKCHAIN FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
FUNDS 
A. What if the Joint Venture Closes Membership? Moreover, What are the 
Antitrust Risks if the Joint Venture Utilizes a Permissioned Blockchain? 
The initial push for blockchain technology involved largely ‘open-
source’ and permissionless or public blockchain technology, which means 
that this technology is completely free and available for use by any person 
or organization that wants to access it.111 The highly publicized digital 
currency Bitcoin is an open-sourced technology.112 Although the initial 
blockchain developments were open-sourced and public, there have been 
recent blockchain developments that were permissioned, meaning that 
they are not freely available to the public as one needs permission to utilize 
that specific blockchain.113  
Further, it is likely that large financial institutions will enter into a 
joint venture with one another to gain access to blockchain technology 
that is used as a digital ledger.114 As stated previously regarding agreements 
among competitors, like HSBC and Rabobank, a joint venture of this type 
would likely necessitate limited access to the blockchain given the highly 
sensitive information and large monetary value at stake.115 Thus, potential 
antitrust issues arise when a blockchain joint venture only allows members 
of the joint venture access to the digital ledger blockchain, but not to a 
                                                 
111 See Cade Metz, The Bitcoin Schism Shows the Genius of Open Source, WIRED (Aug. 19, 2015, 
10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/Bitcoin-schism-shows-genius-open-
source/. 
112 See id. 
113 See Jayachandran, supra note 38. 
114 See ABOUT, R3, supra note 47; Kelly, supra note 9. 
115 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Levi, supra note 10.  
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non-member competitor who seeks access to the permissioned 
blockchain.116 
1. The Degree To Which Access Is Essential To Effective 
Competition 
In Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that in an ordinary competitive environment, the Court would 
have ruled that the joint venture formed by the competing railroads to 
operate and control specific railroad terminals was legal;117 however, it was 
“impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St. 
Louis … without using the facilities entirely controlled by the terminal 
company.”118 Thus, access to the facilities was essential for other 
companies to compete.119   
Thus, the antitrust risks decrease for a member of a joint venture 
utilizing a permissioned blockchain when access is not necessary for rivals 
to effectively compete.120 Financial institutions currently have the ability 
to transfer and receive funds and properly track, record, and audit those 
transfers.121 Further, a joint venture such as this would not “reduce their 
competitor's opportunity” to provide financial transfers between financial 
institutions and keep proper records of those transfers, as competitors 
currently have the ability to engage in performing these types of transfers 
and the resulting recording-keeping without any blockchain technology.122 
Finally, as the Supreme Court in Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis 
stated: “[i]t cannot be controverted that, in ordinary circumstances, a 
                                                 
116 See Unlocking the Blockchain: A Global Legal and Regulatory Guide, supra note 34, at 31, 33. 
117 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912).  
118 Id. at 397. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi, 
supra note 10. 
122 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945).  
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number of independent companies might combine for the purpose of 
controlling or acquiring terminals for their common but exclusive use. In 
such cases other companies might be admitted upon terms or excluded 
altogether.”123  
On the other hand, the antitrust risks increase as access to the 
permissioned blockchain becomes necessary for non-members to 
compete.124 Such may be the case when access to a blockchain developed 
by large joint ventures, like R3, becomes so prevalent and impactful that 
companies that are not members of the joint venture cannot effectively 
compete unless they have access.125 In Terminal Railroad Association of St. 
Louis, the Court instructed that the joint venture be dissolved unless its 
members reorganized the joint venture allowing for “admission of any 
existing or future railroad to joint ownership and control of the combined 
terminal properties, upon such just and reasonable terms as shall place 
such applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and 
burdens with the present proprietary companies.”126 Further, the Court 
required that the reorganized joint venture allow any other company that 
chose not to become a part of the joint venture the use of the joint 
venture’s facilities so long as the other company complied with justified 
terms.127 Similarly, if a joint venture’s blockchain technology becomes 
essential to competition, a joint venture, to lessen the antitrust risks, may 
want to open its membership and allow reasonable access to its technology 
for non-members on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.128  
 
                                                 
123 Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S.  at 405. 
124 See id. at 397.  
125 See id. 
126 Id. at 411. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
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2. The Nature and Scope of the Joint Venture’s Power in the 
Relevant Market 
The formation of joint ventures revolving around blockchain 
technology will likely involve the establishment of bylaws for their 
members.129 Generally, bylaws are necessary for the successful operation 
of any joint venture, especially when that venture is comprised of 
competitors; however, Associated Press clearly established that some bylaws 
violate antitrust laws.130  
In Associated Press, the joint venture— comprised of over twelve 
hundred newspapers with eighty percent of the newspaper circulation—
had market power.131 It also forbade the dissemination of news to non-
members.132 Further, if an applicant newspaper company competed in the 
same market as a member of the Associated Press, that member was given 
veto power to deny the applicant admission into the Associated Press.133 
However, if an applicant newspaper did not compete with an existing 
member, the board of the joint venture had the ability to admit the 
applicant without approval from existing members.134 The Supreme Court 
ruled that these bylaws unlawfully restricted competition by severely 
limiting a new newspaper from entering one of the cities already occupied 
by a member of the Associated Press.135 In fact, the Supreme Court stated 
that “the By-Laws on their face, and without regard to their past effect, 
constitute restraints of trade.”136  
                                                 
129 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1945) (explaining importance 
of bylaws). 
130 See id. at 9. 
131 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166. 
132 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 491. 
133 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 10. 
134 See id. at 10–11; ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 166. 
135 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13. 
136 Id. at 12. 
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If the members of a permissioned blockchain collectively possess 
market power, then the antitrust risks increase if their joint venture 
provides members with a similar veto power that allows members to 
essentially unilaterally restrict access and inhibit other competitors from 
entering the market.137 A court could find that this bylaw provision is 
anticompetitive and illegal without analyzing or considering whether the 
bylaws actually restrained trade, as the Court did in Associated Press.138  
On the other hand, the antitrust risks decrease if the members of a 
permissioned blockchain do not collectively possess market power, as 
their actions are less likely to restrain trade in the relevant market.139 
Further, a permissioned blockchain joint venture that does collectively 
possess market power could still conceivably exclude companies from the 
joint venture, similar to the veto allowed in Associated Press,140 as long as 
the joint venture implemented sufficient safeguards based around the joint 
venture’s decisions to exclude.141 Specifically, the joint venture’s decision 
as to which party to exclude should have safeguards that prevent the 
members of the joint venture from making a biased decision that inhibits 
competition.142 Although the Court has been dismissive of such safeguards 
in the past,143 recently the Court has been more accepting of these 
safeguards.144 
                                                 
137 See id. at 12–13. 
138 See id. at 12. 
139 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 
(1985); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 12–13. 
140 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 10–11. 
141 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988). 
142 See id. 
143 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 13, at 172 (explaining Court’s holding in Silver 
v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
144 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 508–10. 
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3. The Degree to Which the Benefits of the Venture Can be 
Duplicated by Nonparticipants in Some Other Fashion, such 
as Forming a Similar Joint Enterprise 
A permissioned blockchain joint venture’s antitrust risks decrease 
if the joint venture and the underlying blockchain software are 
duplicable.145 For example, if the joint venture’s benefits were based on 
the software’s ease of use and the competing joint venture can buy or 
license similar software that has a similar ease of use, the blockchain joint 
venture’s antirust risks are likely minimal in that regard.146  
On the other hand, the joint venture’s antitrust risks increase if the 
blockchain software and its benefits are not duplicable by a rival joint 
venture formed by competitors.147 For instance, given the inherent 
topographical limitations in Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, it was 
extremely unlikely that a competing joint venture could build other 
facilities necessary to achieve the benefits that the joint venture 
maintained.148 Moreover, one of the benefits of a joint venture, like R3, is 
that all of the member financial institutions exclusively use the 
permissioned blockchain technology created through the joint venture to 
conduct all of their financial transfers.149  Given this, the size of the 
member financial institutions and the fact that access to the permissioned 
blockchain technology is necessary for any party to participate in such 
transfers, it is unlikely that competitors could form a rival joint venture 
that would derive similar benefits.150 
                                                 
145 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 7, at 490–91. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912). 
149 See Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 405; ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 
supra note 7, at 490–91; Kelly, supra note 9. 
150 See Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 405. 
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4. The Business Reasons for the Refusal to Grant Access  
 Finally, a permissioned blockchain joint venture’s antitrust risks 
decrease if it has a significant, legitimate pro-competitive business 
justification for its restraint.151 For example, if it rejected an applicant 
because if the applicant were admitted, neither the applicant nor the 
members of the joint venture could sustain a successful business, and there 
was substantial evidence to substantiate this claim, then the court may 
likely decide for the venture.152 This is because if admittance was allowed, 
the net effect would be to decrease the number of competitors in the 
market, resulting in decreased competition and decreased consumer 
choice.153 Thus, it would likely help a joint venture’s argument if the joint 
venture conducted an analysis for every applicant regarding the 
sustainability of member businesses and the impact on consumers that 
would occur if the applicant was admitted.154  
In Associated Press, the Associated Press did not conduct such an 
analysis.155 It simply allowed one competing member to maintain the 
exclusive power to veto the applicant’s application.156 Thus, an analysis 
concerning the sustainability of businesses in that area could help to 
differentiate the bylaws of the joint venture from the bylaws at issue in 
Associated Press.157  
 
                                                 
151 See  Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
295 (1985). 
152 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1945). 
153 See id. at 13.  
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 10–11, 13. 
156 See id. at 10. 
157 See generally id. at 8–13. 
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B. Would a Joint Venture With a Permissioned Blockchain Receive Per Se 
Treatment or a Rule of Reason Analysis for its Denial of Access to a 
Competitor? 
An additional likely concern for a member of a joint venture is 
whether the denial of access to a permissioned blockchain would be 
deemed per se illegal or subject to a rule of reason analysis.158 In Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc., the Court stated that the distinction between these 
two standards is based on whether the conduct at issue appears on its face 
to “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output . . . or instead one designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and 
render markets more, rather than less, competitive.’”159 Thus, a court’s 
choice between these two legal standards will likely be influenced by the 
factors discussed above in subpart (a).160  
Therefore, a member could argue that a permissioned blockchain 
would increase efficiency for the consumers as much of the administration 
of the transfer of funds would move from a human function to one that 
is computerized and much faster as computers would almost instantly 
perform the record keeping and audit functions that are currently 
performed by people.161 Additionally, they could argue that this would 
increase competition especially among the members of the joint venture 
as the underlying technology that they would offer the consumer is the 
same; thus, these members would likely have to compete on other factors 
such as price, service, and geographic availability.162 Similarly, competition 
                                                 
158 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 
(1985); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 27.  
159 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 289–90 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)). 
160 See id. 
161 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi, 
supra note 10. 
162 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi, 
supra note 10. 
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among both members and non-members would increase, as non-members 
would have to develop their own competing technology or increase other 
services offered and/or decrease prices.163 Additionally, according to the 
holding in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., in cases where courts often 
apply the per se illegal standard, the joint ventures are actively seeking to 
harm the non-member through actions that are not justifiable by 
procompetitive benefits, like in Associated Press.164  Taking all of these 
factors into consideration, it is unlikely that a court would apply a per se 
illegal standard to a joint venture that is not open to all competitors if the 
joint venture can offer significant procompetitive business justifications.165  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The popularity of blockchain has correlated with the advent, and 
widespread adoption, of Bitcoin; however, uses outside of digital currency 
abound for blockchain technology and its users.166 Given that blockchain 
can store vast amounts of information in a highly encrypted database, one 
of blockchain’s more impactful uses will likely concern transfers among 
large financial organizations and digitizing the record-keeping and audit 
functions that result from these transfers.167 Currently, these transfers cost 
over one trillion dollars per year, a large part of which is likely used to 
cover the administrative duties and resulting expenses that it takes to 
complete these transfers.168 Thus, financial institutions implementing 
blockchain as a digital ledger to keep records for each individual 
                                                 
163 See Gopinath, supra note 35; Jayachandran, supra note 38; Kelly, supra note 9; Levi, 
supra note 10. 
164 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 294; Associated Press v. United States, 326 
U.S. 1, 12–13 (1945).  
165 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 289–90, 294. 
166 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1–4; Marr, supra note 8; O'Shields, supra note 10, at 181; 
21 Areas of Blockchain Application Beyond Financial Services, supra note 40.   
167 See Klayman, supra note 10, at 1–4. 
168 See High Tech Meets Low Finance, supra note 54. 
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transaction could decrease these costs while also increasing security and 
efficiency.169  
To fully realize the benefits of blockchain as a digital ledger, many 
financial institutions will likely have to join together in a joint venture so 
that the parties are using the same blockchain technology, as that would 
enhance efficiency and maximize the utility of blockchain.170 However, a 
joint venture among competitors can give rise to unique antitrust issues, 
as a joint venture of unrelated competitors that excludes or refuses other 
non-member competitors from accessing the joint venture’s facilities is 
challengeable under the Sherman Act.171  
As the number of large financial institutions entering joint 
ventures to utilize blockchain increases, the antitrust scrutiny will likely 
increase as well.172 These joint ventures can take steps to reduce antitrust 
risks.173 Antitrust risks decrease if a joint venture proactively develops 
procedures to organize and document evidentiary analysis of the 
procompetitive benefits of the joint venture and the positive impact on 
consumers.174 Further, antitrust risks decrease if a permissioned 
blockchain maintained by a joint venture comprised of large financial 
                                                 
169 See High Tech Meets Low Finance, supra note 54; Klayman, supra note 10, at 4; O'Shields, 
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institutions provides reasonable access to competitors.175 Additionally, 
antitrust risks decrease if the resulting benefits from a joint venture’s 
blockchain technology are duplicable by a competitor.176 With significant 
increases in utilization of blockchain and projections of expansion beyond 
financial institutions, it is important that joint ventures consider the 
antitrust risks and issues underlying the joint venture’s blockchain 
technology and take proactive steps, such as those outlined above, to 
decrease the antitrust risk.177  
                                                 
175 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 294–96; United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912). 
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